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In January 2011, the Arab World appeared in flux. 
Bouazizi’s self-immolation on 17 December 2010 had 
unleashed a myriad trend of social tumults, and sent 
shockwaves across the region. In return, the external 
actors had to adjust to the new Arab World that was un-
folding at their doorstep. Like their counterparts in the 
United States, the European Union, and almost every 
country that formed a part of the international com-
munity, the Pakistani authorities battled with the same 
set of complications: what if the Middle East and North 
Africa evolved into a system of regional relations less 
compatible, or diametrically at odds, with Pakistan’s 
preferences? Guided by this rationale, the former For-
eign Secretary Shamsad Assad proclaimed that, while 
Pakistan confronted a host of domestic challenges, it 
had ‘no time to focus on international issues.’1 Sham-
sad had spoken these words prior to the regional flare-
ups, leading one to the evaluation that, even before the 
Arab Spring, Pakistan had no interest in entanglement. 
Accordingly, Pakistan continued to follow a cautious 
approach to this region of troubling change: given the 
wide array of problems Pakistan was facing at home, 
the Arab Spring was the least of its concerns.  
In hindsight, this statement is rightly deconstructed as 
a rhetorical shield to guard the actual, wait-and-see ap-
proach that allowed for a strategic reflection on how 
Pakistan should reframe, interpret and make sense of 
the prospects of the future Arab World. The words of 
the Foreign Secretary served as a template for political 
action, only when a hands-off approach preserved, or 
promised to forge, advantageous conditions.
Pakistan then championed the longevity of entrenched 
dictatorships, or came to be at loggerheads with them, 
in light of several factors – chief amongst which was 
the security of energy and petroleum supplies. As 
Pakistan’s current Minister for Water and Power ar-
ticulated, Khawaja Mohammed Asif, energy was the 
country’s ‘number one challenge, even a bigger chal-
lenge than terrorism.’2 In this respect, the dilemma of 
steering the country of the quagmire of this energy 
crisis weighed heavily on Pakistan’s policies. Another 
regional interest, to which Islamabad tried to obtain a 
basic assurance, was the fate of Afghanistan follow-
ing the withdrawal of the American troops, and that the 
political fabric of Kabul be reconstructed to a pattern 
palatable to its interests. As it will be discussed below, 
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the executive team in Islamabad operated cautiously: 
far from hurrying into ironclad alliances, it formulated 
a foreign policy that was characterized by a degree of 
caution and pragmatism to realize the above-outlined 
objectives.  
As the relevant sections will demonstrate, the shifting 
political landscape in the Middle East also had Pakistan 
trot a fine line between Riyadh, its closest Sunni ally, 
and Tehran, an important neighbor with whom Islama-
bad shares a volatile border. This paper will investigate 
the circumstances under which the Pakistan’s Peoples 
Party until 2013, as well as the Muslim League thereaf-
ter, balanced the Saudi-Iranian dynamics or gravitated 
towards either orbit. It will argue that to what extent Pa-
kistan operated under Saudi pressure depended upon 
the incumbent administration’s platform, the support 
from the electorate, as well as the larger political and 
economic interests vested in the conflict-zone. 
A balanced appraisal of Pakistan’s response to the 
Arab Springs confirms that it has been fundamentally 
prudent. When Bouazizi’s self-immolation in February 
2011 triggered a revolutionary wave of urban protests 
that is still shaking the Arab World, Pakistan followed 
country-based ad-hoc policies, rather than an overarch-
ing ‘grand’ strategy. Its foreign policy was character-
ized by caution, pragmatism and an eclectic approach 
to crises. This study will examine under in what ways 
and under what kind of conditions Pakistan reacted to 
this sea change, and connected its objectives with the 
world of actual policy outcomes. 
Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and petroleum-political 
leverage that never was
When the Libyan Uprising erupted on 15 February 
2011, Pakistan demonstrated a mode of indifference: 
accepting Gaddafi’s position as legitimate, they dis-
missed the National Transition Council’s (TNC) claim to 
be the real representative of the people, stipulating that 
the NTC did not hail from a strong platform to govern 
Libya.3 It seemed as if Islamabad lacked any reason to 
embark on an active pursuit of regime change and al-
ter the political landscape: neither forcing out Gaddafi’s 
volatile leadership nor ushering in a pluralistic govern-
ment, it reasoned, would serve its interests. 
2Should Libya’s massive reserves of crude oil, however, 
not have prompted Pakistan to assist in the installment 
of a more amiable government in Tripoli? This assump-
tion holds some truth, yet it also comes with a caveat. 
In contrast to popular belief, the value of Libyan oil does 
not lie in its quantity; even before February 2011, Libya 
only exported about $1.6 million barrels of oil per day, 
which amounts to only 2% of the world’s oil produc-
tion.4 The value is in its quality: it exports a certain type 
of oil that could be used with little refinement, whereas 
the Saudi petroleum, for instance, has to be refined into 
gasoline.5 Due to its sheer price, however, this quality 
holds little importance for Pakistan. For instance, the 
Libyan crude oil was priced at $79.67 per barrel in 2010 
and $112.89 in 2011, while the Saudi product was sold 
at $75.56 and $104.06, and the UAE petrol at $78.10 
and $106.21, respectively.6
In addition to the Libyan oil prices that would become 
a dampen on the wallet, Pakistan does not have the 
facilities to process the product into gasoline or fuel 
oil, and is therefore forced to import more expensive 
refined products. In this sector, too, Libya has never 
been an ‘important’ trading partner, since Libya is not 
a leading supplier of refined petroleum. Instead, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates remain 
Pakistan’s top three trading partners: the Saudi gaso-
line, for instance, was sold at the fixed price of 83.5 
Saudi Royal Riyal between 2009 and 2013 - which is 
roughly around $22.25 across five years.7 On the other 
hand, prior to sanctions in 2010, Libya sold its refined 
products from 31.8 Libyan dinars, or $23.85 - a consid-
erable difference in price for a Pakistan that is battling 
with the aftereffects of the global recession.8 Although 
Kuwaiti gasoline remained fixed at the high rate of 11.4 
Kuwaiti Dinars in 2011 (tentatively $38,79), there is an 
interesting reason why Pakistan imported 1/6 of its oil 
from Kuwait in 2011, spending close to $2 billion on im-
porting three million tons of diesel fuel and one million 
ton of furnace oil.9 Pakistan had secured an arrange-
ment with Kuwait at the peak of the financial crisis that 
put the Kuwaiti supplies on a two-month deferred pay-
ment plan. Gasoline from Kuwait was then flowing in 
very affordable prices.  
After Gaddafi’s death on 20 October 2011, Pakistan’s 
position shifted for reasons closely related to these dy-
namics. It remained cautious not to get sucked into an 
event, out of which the country could not garner any 
remedies to allay its energy crisis; yet, Pakistan did 
not eschew the idea of cooperation per se. Before it 
granted official recognition to the NTC as the sole rep-
resentative of the Libyan people,10 Pakistan pursued 
a wait-and-see approach, but finally initiated full diplo-
matic relations on 3 November 2011 following Libya’s 
African neighbors (excluding Algeria) and the Organi-
zation of the Islamic Cooperation.11 Furthermore, when 
the Libyan representative to the ICCI expressed in 
June 2013 his country’s willingness to explore invest-
ment opportunities in construction and infrastructural 
development, Islamabad did not ignore this as undesir-
able information.12 The Libyan embassy in Islamabad 
was issuing around 150-200 visas per day in the sum-
mer of 2013 for those in need of employment.13 When 
POMEAS POLICY PAPERNo.5, APRIL 2015
Pakistan’s silence in Egypt and 
Tunisia, too, was due in no small 
part to their tenuous economic 
relations.
the civil war erupted again in May 2014, however, the 
authorities in Islamabad paused their business trans-
actions, once again exercising caution vis-à-vis what 
seemed to be troubling change in an irrelevant country. 
Pakistan’s silence in Egypt and Tunisia, too, was due 
in no small part to their tenuous economic relations. 
Although Egypt is the largest non-OPEC oil producer 
in Africa, it is also the largest oil consumer of the con-
tinent, accounting for more than 20% of its total oil 
consumption: indeed, total oil consumption grew by an 
annual average of 3% over the past decade, outpac-
ing production capacity since 2010.14 To add fuel to 
the flames, Egypt’s refinery output had embarked on 
a sharp decline in 2009, and would eventually decline 
by 28% between 2009 and 2013. Since the country im-
ported petroleum products to whet the appetite of its 
domestic consumer, it was naturally in no condition to 
satisfy Pakistan’s need for refined petroleum. Further-
more, Egypt’s natural gas production had remained on 
a similar downward spiral since 2009, causing the gov-
ernment to divert natural gas supplies from export to 
local markets.15
Production of petroleum had also been on decline in 
Tunisia from its peak of 120,000 barrels a day in mid-
1980s, and would eventually drop down to 60,000 bar-
rels a day in 2013. Protests in 2011 also hampered the 
projects to revamp the oil production capacity, often 
3thermore priced at $106 per barrel in 2011 - very mod-
estly priced in comparison to OPEC petro-giants (see 
above).20 To look after its own key interests, Pakistan 
then stepped forth to prevent the further radicalization 
of counter-regime mobilization. 
The defense of the status quo was not only connected 
to economic interests; the prospect of Shia empower-
ment had also evolved into a source of vexation for the 
region’s Sunni powers. When the Shia masses threat-
ened to march towards Bahrain’s presidential palace, 
King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia feared that al-Khalifa 
might accommodate them at the negotiating table and 
launch a dialogue on political concessions to prevent 
the situation from deteriorating any further.21 Saudi Ara-
bia was particularly vulnerable to spillover effects from 
Bahrain, since its own Shia population resided along 
the border with the Gulf kingdom, in eastern, oil-rich 
swathes of territories. Riyadh’s fear was that, if al-Khal-
ifa set a ‘promising’ precedent for the Bahraini Shias, 
the Saudi Shias, too, might be motivated into action. To 
quell this threat, Riyadh launched an antirevolutionary 
campaign: far from consisting of only acts of aggres-
sion, this campaign included social packages on hous-
ing, employment opportunities and medical benefits, 
the estimated value of which amounted to $11 billion.22
Worries about Shia empowerment, however, were 
not only linked to such domestic issues; they quickly 
shaded into thoughts of Iranian fifth column activism. 
Contending for supremacy in the Gulf and Central Asia 
had been a staple of Iranian foreign policy since the 
reign of the Qajar Shahs through the Pahlavi period 
and into the Islamic Republic under Khomeini.23 If ef-
fectively manipulated, these Shia uprisings could bring 
Iran closer to realizing this objective. The offer of an 
Iranian assistance, for instance, would not only allow 
the Shia factions to take a less arduous path to their 
conclusion, but also furnish Iran with leverage in the 
region. Tehran could then sweep in at the back of these 
‘Shia versus Sunni’ protests and flex its muscles over 
the Gulf monarchies.24
There was another development around this time that 
led Riyadh to take such measures to neutralize Shia 
discontent: the withdrawal of the US troops from Iraq at 
the end of 2011. American troops were leaving Bagh-
dad without a stable government or a security appara-
tus, creating a power vacuum in Iraq that both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran were ambitious to fill in.25 This is why 
the urban protests in Bahrain surfaced at a sensitive 
time: if the Saudi authorities remained locked within 
driving away foreign investors who could not have their 
development plans approved by the Tunisian parlia-
ment. Tunisia’s oil refinery had also failed to meet the 
domestic demand for consumption since 2011: while 
Tunisia’s exports of refined petroleum to Pakistan 
amounted to 32.72% of its total exports in 2010, it did 
not even make it Tunisia’s list of exports in 2011 and 
2012.16 For Pakistan then, Tunisia lacked any sort of 
economic value. 
When grappling with the upheavals in Libya, Egypt 
and Tunisia, Islamabad shunned formulations of any 
policy-lines that would have required a commitment 
to activism. Pakistan did not conduct any lucrative, fi-
nancial transactions with these countries, and showed 
hesitance to get sucked into the tumultuous events that 
unfurled within their borders.  
Undying support for the al-Khalifa dynasty – prom-
ise of a Pak-controlled Kabul?
When the uprising in Bahrain erupted, the then Presi-
dent Zardari emphasized his country’s support for 
the al-Khalifa government, stating that the upheavals 
engendered instability and were to be condemned.17 
Immediately after the initial exchange of fire, adver-
tisements started to appear across Pakistani media, 
calling for ‘army drill instructors, anti-riot commanders 
and retired police with previous army and police expe-
rience’ on ‘urgent requirement’ for Bahrain’s National 
Guard.18 By late April, early May 2011, 2500 Pakistanis 
had been recruited into National Guards, increasing its 
size by 50%.19
This active involvement is somewhat attributed to par-
lous economic conditions; indeed, Bahrain’s reservoirs 
of petroleum and natural gas, coupled with its capac-
ity to unleash a steady flow of these commodities, 
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weighed heavily on Pakistan’s stance on the matter. 
For instance, Bahrain constantly ranked amongst the 
top ten import origins of refined petroleum to Pakistan 
- the 5th in both 2010 and 2011. Bahraini oil was fur-
4In fact, Islamabad had tailored its 
policies towards a certain end, 
and not rushed in blindly.
Saudi Arabia, these analysts feared, could be inter-
preted by the Sunni radicals as the rise of anti-Shiism 
in the executive branches, and therefore create deeper 
fault-lines between the two sects. Pakistan was already 
bogged down by sectarian clashes within its borders, 
especially in the province of Baluchistan that stretches 
along the border with Iran. Baluchistan was already 
replete with revolts due to a host of socio-economic 
grievances (such as scarcity of water and underde-
veloped infrastructure), its volatile location (along the 
borders with Iran and Afghanistan), and neglect from 
central administration.28 The province had also become 
a hotbed of militant extremism, serving as an opera-
tional ground for rabidly anti-Shia organizations, such 
as Soldiers of Sahabah (Sipah-i Sahabah), the Army 
of Jhangvi (Lashkar-e Jhangvi) and the Army of the 
Khorasan (Lashkar-i Khorasan). Furthermore, the fact 
that Pakistan currently plays the host to about 26 mil-
lion Shias out of a population of 190 million, the larg-
est population of the Muslim sects adherents, makes it 
possible that localized incidents could easily spiral out 
of control into nation-wide flare-ups.29 
One strong case in point, for instance, is that Lashkar-I 
Jhangvi retaliated with brazen attacks on buses carry-
ing pilgrims to Iran, Iraq and Syria around Quetta, killing 
at least 200 Shiite in December 2013.30 Lashkar-i Kho-
rasan furthermore launched attacks upon the Makron 
region, the coastal division of the province with 700-
km coastline on the Strait of Hormuz, where the over-
whelming percentage of the Pakistani Shias resides.31
The fact that deploying troops against the Bahraini 
Shia would escalate sectarian tensions at home would 
have entered the calculus of the Pakistani leadership. 
Granted, a country that had been witnessing unprec-
edented levels of sectarian violence should have 
viewed entanglement with a measure of unease. Lust 
for political clout, however, often trumps over a coun-
try’s commitment to humanitarian principles; in this 
case, too, the latter fell by the wayside in the race to 
the top. The turmoil in Baluchistan could have given 
pause to the Pakistani administration that was at times 
inclined towards precaution - but only when it served 
its own agenda. Islamabad was wary of the potential 
outcome of the revolutionary wave that was shaking 
Bahrain, and mobilized to preserve stability under the 
status quo. It might have fostered an illusory stability 
that rested on a precarious footing; yet, it guaranteed a 
Pakistan-friendly political landscape. 
an internal struggle, Iran could carry on with a deter-
ministic thrust towards its neighbor and place itself on 
an advantageous footing. Furthermore, this scenario 
evoked the specter of a Middle East gradually coming 
under Iran’s influence – and turning Riyadh’s darkest 
nightmare into an even darker reality. 
Then why did Pakistan throw its weight behind the 
Saudi Kingdom in Bahrain? Upon a superficial glance, 
one is tempted to label this course of action as being 
heavily Saudi-indexed. That the Saudi requests guided 
a blind Pakistan into the battle-zone is, nonetheless, 
an incomplete analysis, especially if one considers the 
traditional platform of President Zardari’s Pakistan’s 
Peoples Party (PPP). Historically, the PPP tended to 
emphasize Pakistan’s freedom of action from Saudi 
Arabia, and not cultivated a bond of trust with the 
House of Saud. 
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In fact, Islamabad had tailored its policies towards a 
certain end, and not rushed in blindly. The most potent 
driving force, in this regard, was the calculation that 
the fate of Iraq in 2011 would determine the fate of Af-
ghanistan after the NATO withdrawal in 2014. In order 
to reconstruct the political fabric of Kabul to a pattern 
palatable to Pakistan, the power had to be transferred 
to a Sunni administration. This meant that this process 
could not be upended by Iran. Infusing manpower into 
the Saudi-led campaign then served an indirect, albeit 
a clear purpose: it would secure Riyadh’s backing for 
Islamabad’s vision for the Afghan reconciliation.26 As 
discussed above, had Saudi Arabia become engulfed 
with sectarian conflict and unable to counter the in-
evitable showdown in Iraq with Iran, this would have 
jeopardized the future of Afghanistan to the detriment 
of Pakistan’s interests.  
Many analysts heavily criticized this intervention, ar-
guing that it would intensify the sectarian tensions at 
home and thus commit the country to an enormous 
peril. Since the Pakistani recruits were tasked with 
suppressing the Shia in Bahrain, they quickly became 
the face of the brutal crackdown engineered by the 
Sunnis.27 Advancing into deepening commitments with 
The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Assad and 
a shifting Pakistan
Pakistan once again entertained a policy of strict neu-
trality when the Syrian civil war erupted on 15 March 
2011. Islamabad confined the sphere of its activism to 
the parameters set by the UNSC Resolution 2043 of 
21 April 2012 that created the United Nations Special 
Mission in Syria; in accordance with its mandate, Paki-
stan championed the cause of ‘[monitoring] a cessation 
of hostilities of all sorts by all parties…and [support-
ing] the implementation of the 6-point plan to end the 
conflict in Syria.’32 Yet, Islamabad remained unrelent-
ing in its opposition to military intervention or airstrikes 
against Bashar al-Assad.
For Pakistan, Syria was relevant due to Bashar al-
Assad’s cordial ties with the administration in Tehran. 
Since the proposal of the UNDP Report ‘Peace and 
Prosperity Gas Pipelines’ in December 2003, Pakistan 
and Iran had been engaged in deliberations over the 
construction of a pipeline that would transport Iranian 
natural gas to Pakistan. This project was set to com-
mence in October 2012, and be completed by De-
cember 2014.33 For Pakistan, this was a matchless 
opportunity on two fronts. First of all, as a result of the 
sanctions imposed following Bin Laden’s capture in Ab-
bottabad in May 2011, its energy industry was virtu-
ally in shambles. This deal with Iran promised to build 
it back up within a considerable short period of time. 
Also, cooperation with Iran was likely to buy political 
capital with the Shia communities across Pakistan.  
The pipeline deal should also be seen as a balancing 
act between Iran and Saudi Arabia by Zardari: it was 
meant to shore up Pakistan’s ties with the former to 
reduce the degree of its reliance on the latter.34 As a 
center-left, socialist-progressive party, PPP has histori-
cally espoused amiable relations with the Soviet Union, 
China, and Iran, and perceived the Saudi influence on 
Pakistan’s foreign policy with a strong measure of wari-
ness. This policy acts was then in line with Zardari’s 
party platform. Furthermore, when Riyadh suspended 
oil supplies on deferred payments due to PPP’s friend-
lier approach to its archenemy, this project promised to 
safeguard Pakistan’s industries from their restricted ac-
cess to the Saudi reserves, and therefore help Islama-
bad deal with its chronic and severe power outages.35 
This project was later cancelled in February 2014 un-
der the leadership of Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League. 
Although judged as impractical, the deal was not unex-
5
These developments placed Pakistan directly at odds 
with the Iranian leadership, who had been shoring up 
the Assad government since 2011, and raised security 
concerns.40 Forces were already stationed along the 
Indian border to the Kashmir dispute, and the military 
still remained embroiled within a protracted struggle 
against the Taliban in Waziristan since the Taliban’s 
siege of the Karachi airport in June 2014.41 These had 
already stretched the defense forces beyond capacity. 
If the boundary with Iran now needed to be manned as 
a measure of precaution, Pakistan would not have the 
ammunition required. 
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pected: the Muslim League had historically followed a 
more Saudi-indexed approach to foreign relations, and 
would have been vexed by the PPP’s harmonious rela-
tions with Iran. After the 3-day visit of the Saudi crown 
prince Salman bin Abdul-Aziz al-Saud, in his capacity 
as the defense minister in February 2014, Islamabad 
and Riyadh promulgated a joint statement, calling for 
‘the formation of a transnational governing body in Syr-
ia with full executive powers enabling it to take charge 
of all affairs.’36 The defense cooperation meeting was to 
reach an agreement, whereby Riyadh would purchase 
military arms, equipment and training instructions for 
the Syrian opposition. Furthermore, $1.5 billion was 
transferred to Pakistan’s state-bank a few weeks later, 
which later turned out to be a Saudi contribution to sta-
bilize the devalued rupee against the US dollar. A For-
eign Ministry official also announced Islamabad’s plans 
to sell JF-17 Thunder, a combat aircraft, and ANZA, the 
shoulder-fired, anti-craft missile that was jointly devel-
oped with China – both which will presumably end up 
at the hands of the Syrian rebels.37 As anticipated, the 
Sharif government also rapidly changed tack on the 
pipeline-deal, cancelling it without having built any of 
the 781 km pipeline that started to incur a daily fine of 
$3 million.38 In exchange, Islamabad switched sides on 
the Syrian front, and demanded the departure of As-
sad.39
Like for every country, for Pakistan too, then Syria is 
a serious flashpoint. When marred with such security 
concerns, why did Pakistan not exercise more pre-
caution? The first idea that comes to mind is that the 
Muslim League aimed at appeasing the Saudis after 
five years of the Iran-friendly PPP administration. The 
deal was indeed forged at a moment most opportune 
for the House of Saud. Stuck at a stalemate, the Syr-
ian rebels, backed by the Saudi forces, needed extra 
weapons and equipment, but above all tactical training 
for combat. Given their decades of experience fight-
ing insurgents in the country’s war against the Taliban, 
Pakistan’s military trainers offered the most effective 
remedy.42
Just like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, too, feared the expan-
sion of Iran’s sphere of influence in the region, espe-
cially since an Iran with a stronger leverage could pose 
a graver threat in Afghanistan after December 2014. An 
Iran-friendly government in Syria was also more dan-
gerous than a Bahrain governed by a Shia-dominated 
parliament. If Assad emerged victorious from the bat-
tlefield, he would collaborate with Iran and Lebanon, 
his two allies in the Levant, creating a contiguous arc of 
Iranian influence stretching from the Persian Gulf to the 
Mediterranean Sea. With a foothold in the Levant and 
a more serious peril to Pakistan’s Sunni partners in the 
region, Iran could assert itself more vigorously in Kabul 
– undeniably, to the detriment of Pakistan’s interests. 
Another factor was the concern over Pakistan’s energy 
shortages. Given the diplomatic stalemate over Iran 
and the United States’ deliberations on the former’s 
nuclear capacity in early 2014 (before the Rouhani and 
Obama administrations concluded the interim agree-
ment), the US forewarned Islamabad that this project 
would incur sanctions upon Pakistan in connection with 
Iran’s nuclear program. Instead, Washington even ad-
vised Islamabad to import petroleum from Turkmeni-
stan through Afghanistan, thus bypassing the need to 
enter into deliberations with the Iranian authorities.43 
This consideration pushed Islamabad closer towards 
Riyadh: when the prospect of a settlement with Iran 
was fading away, their alliance promised a Saudi-pet-
rodollar infusion into the ailing economy, easier access 
to refined petroleum products, and military support in 
the post-NATO Afghan reconciliation. 
The latest flashpoint: Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen
Empowered by the revolutions within the larger remit of 
the Arab Spring in 2011 and later strengthened by the 
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international ousting of Yemen’s dictator Ali Saleh in 
2012, the Houthis mobilized against the Saudi-backed 
Hadi government in March 2015.44 In reaction to their 
attempts to take over the central command, Saudi 
Arabia formed a Sunni military bloc against the rebel 
forces in late March-early April 2015. Since then, Yem-
en is being clobbered with aerial bombardment by the 
Saudi-led offensive, along with UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar and Egypt. The intervention, dubbed Operation 
Decisive Storm, has drawn Iran into the conflict, whose 
is bolstering the Shia Houthis in the periphery against 
the Sunni center backed by the Saudi-coalition. 
In early April 2015, Pakistan still refused to come on-
board this coalition, and the nature of its contribution 
straddled the ambivalent grey-zone. The Prime Minis-
ter Sharif promised cooperation on counter-terrorism 
measures, but remained silent in terms of providing 
logistical support, or contributing ships, aircraft and 
troops to restore President Hadi.45 In another act of 
defiance, the Pakistani leadership also refused to re-
locate its embassy from Sanaa to Amen, as the Gulf 
Cooperation Council had done, to distance themselves 
from the rebels.46
Many analysts averred that the Sharif government 
could not hold this oppositional ground for long. It is 
thanks to the Saudi efforts that Sharif is still firmly an-
chored within Pakistan’s political fabric: after General 
Musharraf ousted him out of power and imprisoned him 
in 1999, Sharif was welcomed in Riyadh as a guest 
of the royal family.47 Also, the Saudis investments in 
Pakistan’s infrastructure have furnished the Kingdom 
with enough leverage to demand support of any na-
ture. Riyadh supplied petroleum to Pakistan in 1998, 
when the latter’s energy industry was crumbling down 
due to international sanctions imposed by the interna-
tional community in retaliation for its nuclear testing.48 
Perhaps needless to mention, the Kingdom still serves 
as the largest oil supplier to Pakistan and provides em-
ployment for a high number of Pakistani nationals.49
In many respect, however, it would have been illogi-
cal for Pakistan to become entangled in a military op-
eration in Yemen. As discussed above, the Pakistani 
military is already overstretched. Its border with Af-
ghanistan still remains unstable; the Kashmir region 
is as restive as ever; and the Baluchistan region that 
sits on the Iranian-Pakistani border is also simmering 
with sectarian tensions.50 The leadership furthermore 
runs the risk of losing its struggle against the Taliban in 
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North Waziristan with a permanent, coherent military; 
if the already-insufficient manpower became diverted 
to other fronts, the Taliban would almost certainly walk 
away victorious from the battle-field. 
Initially, there was also little support within Pakistan 
to jump into a war that has acquired such a sectarian 
edge. Indeed, the conflict in Yemen had evolved into a 
source of vexation amongst young activists, who ex-
press their disquietude with the fact that their country is 
being used a proxy battleground by Saudi Arabia. They 
want Pakistan to embrace an image of ‘Islamic interna-
tionalism,’ and do not appear to be afraid of stepping up 
their efforts to have Islamabad promote reconciliation 
rather than taking sides in a conflict far away from their 
country.51 These activists also put forward that bolster-
ing the Saudi efforts would violate the founding princi-
ple of Pakistan - that it was founded as a home base for 
South Asia’s Muslim community and ‘not founded on 
any particular understanding of Islam.’52 Also, if Paki-
stan threw its weight behind the Sunni alliance, it could 
embolden the anti-Shia organizations at home and trig-
ger a new wave of anti-sectarian violence.’53
Yet, many still anticipated that the Pakistani leadership 
would be wary of assuming a firmer stance against 
the Saudi demands and would shy away from reject-
ing its request outright. After days of debate, however, 
the Pakistani Parliament voted unanimously in favor 
of preserving neutrality.54 Instead of partaking in Op-
eration Decisive Storm, the authorities announced their 
willingness to engage in proactive diplomacy to bring 
an end to the crisis. It is significant that the Parliament 
remained silent on the notion of ‘troop deployment’ in 
general; in this sense, this resolution does not rule out 
the possibility of dispatching ground forces to Saudi 
Arabia in the event of an invasion of Islam’s holy sites, 
just as it did during the Gulf War in 1991.55
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supremacists and fears the escalation of anti-Shia ten-
sions. The prospect of loosening sanctions on Iran’s 
oil industry is another factor that renders involvement 
unpalatable.56 Islamabad has even lit the green light 
on continuing the pipeline-project with Iran that had 
been stalled roughly a year ago, now that it anticipates 
the lifting of the international embargo. The pipeline 
will allow Pakistan to reap the earliest harvest of the 
framework agreement reached between Tehran and 
the P5+1 countries in early April 2015, and remedy 
its crippling electricity industry due to its shortage of 
fuels.57 The leadership’s willingness to go ahead with 
the project shows that, against the backdrop of these 
developments, it aims to transform Iran from an uneasy 
neighbor into, if possible, a lucrative partner. Accord-
ing to the estimates, Iranian reserves are the cheapest 
supply options for Pakistan.58
To be sure, the Sharif government is still torn between 
balancing its interests in Iran and remaining on good 
terms with Saudi Arabia. The fate of Afghanistan is also 
far from being set aside in favor of either Iran or the 
Sunni powers. Yet, the promise of the opening of the 
Iranian economy, coupled with the fact that Pakistan 
presents a market hungry for Iran’s energy products, 
will forge a relationship with deep roots in pragmatism. 
Although the two could clash over regional clout in the 
future, their economic cooperation is likely not to let 
tensions escalate beyond a certain point. 
This recent declaration of impartiality therefore demon-
strates that the leadership in Islamabad is still capable 
of keeping together its unwillingness to force things on 
the ground, if acts of such nature will work towards the 
country’s detriment. Even after days of intense debat-
ing at the highest executive level and despite Riyadh’s 
status as a prized ally and a generous donor, Pakistan 
showed that its foreign policy would further national in-
terests – irrespective of any extraneous considerations. 
Conclusion: No room for selfless support for 
Muslim democracies
Pakistan’s profile as a Muslim country does not have 
an immediate impact on its foreign policy, which is 
still driven through pragmatic calculations rather than 
religious considerations. In Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, 
becoming entangled in the messy politics surrounding 
changes underway offered no political or financial ben-
efits - which led Pakistan to stand idly on the sidelines. 
The conflicts in Bahrain and Syria, by contrast, loomed 
large on Pakistan’s agenda for the very reasons that 
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Pakistan’s posturing towards the crisis in Yemen then 
proves that its foreign policy is not strictly Sunni-
indexed. As discussed above, the country is already 
busy with major operations against militant Islamist 
had peeled away from the luster of intervention in Lib-
ya, Egypt and Tunisia: first of all, activism secured the 
continuous flow of oil from Kuwait and Saudi petroleum 
fields and thus offered a way to mitigate the effects of 
Pakistan’s energy crisis. Furthermore, it served Islama-
bad’s broader objective of preventing the emergence 
of Iran’s ‘Shia axis’ that stretches from Baghdad to Bei-
rut, with a regional clout over in South Asia, after the 
US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s 
recent dilemma over the crisis in Yemen, and the Par-
liament’s ultimate veto against joining the Saudi-led 
Sunni coalition, showed that the country would not be 
catapulted into the fold of an international crisis. 
This study has shown that Pakistan shunned formulat-
ing an overarching strategy towards the Arab Spring 
8
that could be carried out automatically in every sce-
nario. There was furthermore no overall statement of 
attitude towards these Muslim masses, who succeed-
ed in revolutionizing their countries along democratic 
patterns or were ultimately crushed by the forceful, and 
massively bloody, resurgence of dictatorship. Islama-
bad rather articulated its own vision for the Middle East, 
and the developments within the broader remit of the 
Arab Springs furnished its authorities with an opportu-
nity to work for its realization. They attempted to evalu-
ate the developments on a country-by-country basis, 
utilized the options at their disposal, and accordingly 
mobilized with prejudice to its perceived set of inter-
ests; as with every other issue that concerns the Middle 
East, the outcome is yet to be seen. 
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